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Abstract 
Explaining the Choice between Alternative Insolvency Regimes for 
Troubled Companies in the UK and Sweden 
Over the past 20 years UK and Swedish insolvency law has moved in the 
direction of company rescue rather than enforcing secured creditor priority.  
However, both countries show a low take up rate of rescue procedures. 
 
This paper uses a cost-benefit approach to examine the choices faced by key 
stakeholders using the now conventional transaction cost paradigm.  The 
paper argues that it is predominantly the ex post indirect and time costs which 
explain the poor take up of customised rescue procedures.  In both countries 
the ex ante cost of delay in filing also presents a tough challenge not fully 
addressed by policymakers. 
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1. Introduction 
A common trend around the world has been the reform of bankruptcy law to 
promote corporate rescue (OECD 1998, Audretsch 2002, European 
Commission 2000, 2003, 2004). In terms of promoting a dynamic market 
economy, bankruptcy rules need to strike a balance between encouraging 
new firm formation through reducing the fear of failure and yet quickly and 
efficiently eliminating non-viable firms. Both the UK and Sweden are 
examples of countries which have changed their bankruptcy laws in partial 
emulation of Chapter 11 in the U.S.A., in order to promote corporate rescue 
and entrepreneurship.  In both cases the take up of these bespoke rescue 
regimes has been very low.  This paper addresses the question - why?  The 
paper will also touch on the broader question of whether the current 
bankruptcy regimes maximise overall welfare, which entails consideration of 
the ex ante effects of bankruptcy resolution on terms and availability of credit 
and the incentives of firm to either under- or over-invest. 
 
The law has an important influence on how financial distress will be tackled in 
two fundamental ways.  Firstly, the legal framework has an influence on the 
costs and benefits of formal rehabilitation and liquidation procedures and 
therefore also on their relative attractiveness (IMF 1999, Claessens & Klapper 
2002). Secondly, particularly where insolvency law is pro-creditor, the threat 
of a formal insolvency procedure may improve incentives for an informal 
workout (IMF 1999, Claessens & Klapper 2002).  The law also influences 
power over regime selection and management.  In practice the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which the law is implemented also makes a difference, 
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however this does not appear to be a significant consideration in either 
country. 
 
The analysis concludes that the legal structures in the UK and Sweden bear 
heavily on the decision-makers but cannot fully explain the low incidence of 
rescue in each country.  New legislation in the UK and possible reform in 
Sweden is reviewed in the light of this analysis and implications of change in 
the law outlined.  Much of the current debate about promoting rescue of 
distressed firms is focused on saving the company, a specific legal entity.  
This paper concludes this emphasis is misguided.  What matters more, from 
an economic perspective, is business survival whether or not the company is 
preserved. 
 
2. Alternative regimes 
Legislation in 1986 (Insolvency Act) in the UK and in 1996 (Business 
Reconstruction Act) in Sweden was designed to provide troubled companies 
with an alternative to liquidation of available assets and an end to the 
company and business.  "Rescue" schemes had been available in the past in 
both countries but uptake had not been good since they were, largely, 
informal and lacked court protection.  Instead, the practical impact of 
insolvency law had been to strengthen the hand of senior and secured 
creditors, typically banks.  The Enterprise Act (2002), that came into effect in 
the UK on 15 September 2003 in respect of corporate entities aimed to make 
the “rescue” regimes administratively easier and also to promote a more 
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collective approach to the resolution of financial distress.  Table 1 summarises 
the various regimes available in the UK and Sweden. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.1 Formal rescues 
 
The UK reforms in 1986 allowed troubled companies to reach a binding 
composition with creditors under the court validated Voluntary Arrangement 
(VA) scheme.  In almost all cases this involves both deferred payment and 
debt forgiveness.  VAs can be arranged within the protection of an 
Administration Order (AO) and could allow a business to continue to trade or 
to hive-down free from the threat of creditor action.  The time-limitedi 
protection afforded by an AO amounts to a legal stay on the actions of 
secured and unsecured creditors including Hire Purchase creditors.  
Additionally an Administrative Receiver (AR) under a qualifying floating 
charge cannot be appointed once the AO has been granted, although secured 
creditors enjoyed the inalienable right to appoint an AR, frustrating an 
application for an AO.  Floating charges dated after 15 September 2003 only 
have the right to appoint an Administrator.  Since this is an “out of court” 
procedure, however, the key difference between this and the pre-15 
September position is that the Administrator is responsible to all creditors 
whilst the AR was responsible only to the appointing creditor. 
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Voluntary Arrangements could also be agreed without an AO, although these 
are rare.  The Insolvency Act 2000 in the UK did allow a similar legal 
moratorium to protect a VA scheme without resort to an AO but only for 
“small” companiesii.  Uptake of this has been very poor. 
 
Significantly, the existing management of the troubled business retains control 
in a VA under the supervision of a licensed insolvency practitioner (IP).  
Where an AO is in force, however, incumbent management surrenders control 
to the Administrator.  Another sometimes-important distinction between a VA 
and an AO is that firms in administration must give notice of that fact on 
invoices, emails and letterheads.  Creditors are assured that their priority level 
will be maintained although, clearly, the risks of continuing to trade need to be 
weighed carefully.  Where VAs are used, there is considerable evidence that 
they have superior rates of business and job preservation as well as superior 
recovery of debt to all classes of creditor (R3 2000, 2004, SPI 1996a, 1996b, 
1997, 1999).  Clearly there is a selection bias in that only the most promising 
cases will get as far as a VA, nevertheless, this track record indicates that 
reconstruction under formal rescue procedures can work. 
 
Under The Enterprise Act 2002 floating chargeiii holders do lose some priority 
in distributions where their charge is dated after 15 September 2003iv.  
Together with a downgrading of the priority of Crown creditorsv more funds 
should be available to unsecured creditors.  Whilst there is no UK study of the 
impact of this change the Finnish experience, following a similar shift in 
priorities in 1993, suggests a straightforward re-distribution of funds from 
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secured to unsecured creditors without increases in bankruptcy costs 
(Bergström et al., 2004). 
 
VA, AO and AR appointments are “out of court” procedures, minimising the 
influence of the bankruptcy registrar/judge considerably.  This typifies the 
contract-based approach of the UK (Franks & Sussman 2003), where courts 
are not minded to interfere in private contracts unless there has been 
misfeasance. 
 
Swedish legislation provides for a similar regime whereby directors of failing 
businesses can apply for court protection against creditor action whilst putting 
a rescue plan together.  Court protection comprises a moratorium on civil and 
debt actions and enforcement, including Retention of Title (ROT) claims.  
Creditors rights are safeguarded, including those with chattels mortgages and 
liens (the moratorium does not apply to them). 
 
Swedish Reconstructions replaced the earlier Compositions, available since 
1970.  Under a reconstruction super-priority is granted to lenders willing to 
extend new credit.  In this way the law can encourage rescue.  In addition, 
post-reconstruction debt is recoverable from the company whilst pre-
reconstruction debt is subject to the moratorium.  As in the UK the directors 
remain in control of the reconstructed company but under the supervision of 
an insolvency professional. 
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The power of the insolvency professional is somewhat weaker than in the UK 
as only “directions” can be issued to company directors.  Failure to follow the 
practitioner’s directions can result in immediate bankruptcy – a punitive 
sanction that is little used in practice.  Further supervision is provided by a 
creditors’ committee of three members, including one employee (Persson, 
2003).  The reconstruction period is an initial three months, extendable in 
three month periods to a maximum 12 months. 
 
In this paper we concentrate on Swedish Reconstruction and the UK rescue 
schemes of AO and VA, acknowledging that the AR procedure is still available 
but in a decreasing number of cases. 
 
2.2 Liquidation schemes 
 
The default position in all insolvency regimes is the winding-up of a company.  
Liquidation is always terminal for a company but businesses can survive in 
whole or in part as they are sold to new owners. Compared to other regimes, 
liquidation is less amenable to the preservation of the business as a going 
concern (Franks & Torous 1992).  For example, compared to a liquidator, the 
administrator has powers to cancel contracts and some liabilities can be 
stayed during the period of administration.  Under the AO the administrator is 
not personally liable for liabilities taken on after appointment. 
 
Thorburn (2000) spells out some key institutional features of the Swedish 
bankruptcy system.  Management is removed from control directly on filing.  It 
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is important to set against this the fact that in Thorburn’s sample, 54% of 
going concern sales were to incumbent management.  There is an automatic 
stay on creditors’ actions.  Many bankruptcy sales are by auctions which are 
ascending and payment must be in cash.  Whilst provision for new debt with 
superpriority exists, in practice it is very rare.  Any new debt tends to be in the 
form of trade credit.  The bankruptcy trustee is under a clear obligation to act 
in the interests of all creditors, who are paid out of the cash proceeds of the 
auction according to absolute priority.  The nature of auction pre-packs in 
Sweden is that a sale for cash is agreed in advance, but since the cash 
proceeds are insufficient to satisfy all claims, the firm must enter bankruptcy. 
The great advantage of pre-packs is lower costs. Thorburn finds that the 
mean time spent in bankruptcy in Sweden is 2.4 months, much lower than the 
time typically spent in Chapter 11, where estimates indicate an average of 
around 2 years, as is also the case in UK CVAs (Cook et al. 2003). 
 
2.3 Informal rescues 
 
The extent of informal business rescue is difficult to ascertain since secrecy 
often surrounds and protects individual cases.  The "London Approach" (Kent, 
1994) is also responsible for a small number of large-scale rescues.  One of 
the advantages of the approach is that company problems can be kept secret 
to some extent, thus helping avoid defections of suppliers and customers 
whose confidence in the distressed company might otherwise be undermined. 
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It is important to note that a substantial amount of reconstruction in the UK 
has occurred within banks for a number of years (Wheatley, 1984).  Franks 
and Sussman (2003) provide a highly revealing insight into the activities of 
banks which have developed “intensive care” units to try and help financially 
distressed companies.  Companies experiencing financial problems are 
passed to the unit who work with them to try and stabilise the situation.  This 
procedure is more complex for multi-banked companies with dispersed public 
debt since co-ordination between lenders is needed.  In Franks & Sussman’s 
study around 75% of companies subject to “intensive care” avoid formal 
insolvency procedures.  Rescue is often accompanied by management 
changes, asset sales and new finance and or increased personal guarantees 
by the directors.  During the period in “intensive care” the debt burden shifts 
from the bank to trade creditors.  This effect is larger when the rescue attempt 
fails and formal insolvency ensues.  When the result is formal insolvency, 
average recovery rates are 77% for the bank, 27% for the preferential 
creditors and virtually nil for unsecured creditors.  This informal reconstruction 
again has the virtue of secrecy.  Adverse selection suggests that firms 
reaching formal insolvency will tend to be the less promising cases.  This 
needs to be borne in mind when evaluating the apparent bias towards 
liquidation in official statistics.  In addition it may well be the case that banks 
pushing firms towards liquidation may be doing so on the basis of private 
information and benefits. 
  
In Sweden informal rescue is termed Ackord and is championed by a trade 
body, Ackordscentralen, which has 5 offices around Sweden including a head 
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office based in Gothenberg (Cook, 2001b).  Ackordscentralen acknowledge, 
however, that their main work is in bankruptcy since most failing companies 
leave matters too late for rescue to be viable. 
 
2.4 The incidence of rescue 
 
Neither VAs nor AOs recorded substantial numbers of cases until 1994.  
During 1990 - 1992 liquidation was the preferred route for the large number of 
insolvent companies suffering from the UK recession.  Numbers of UK 
corporate insolvencies are shown in Table 2 and indicate that, in 1995, rescue 
regimes accounted for 20.7% of insolvency cases.  This had fallen by 2004 to 
13.6% largely due to the rapid decline in numbers of ARs.  During these same 
years the actual numbers of AOs and CVAs grew. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
In Sweden the pattern of usage of winding up and rescue mechanisms was 
remarkably similar to that in the UK between 1995 and 2004.  Notwithstanding 
the change in the law in 1996 numbers of rescues and reconstructions have 
represented under 1% of insolvency cases.  In 1991 there were 938 
compositions but this represented only 1.86% of all cases.  At the time 
Sweden was, itself, experiencing recession and a banking crisis, features that 
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tend to mitigate against rescue.  Since 1995 the numbers of insolvencies has 
fallen to a fairly consistent level as shown in Table 3. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
3. Cost-benefit analysis 
3.1 The Transaction Cost Approach 
 
A variety of direct (e.g. fees to legal and financial advisers) and indirect costs 
(spelled out in detail below) of bankruptcy have been identified which are 
borne by financially distressed companies, which may be considered under 
the overall umbrella of transaction costs.  This transaction cost perspective 
has become the dominant framework for explaining the choice between 
alternative modes of resolving financial distress, creditors being assumed to 
opt for the regime with the highest expected net returns (Gilson 1997, Gilson, 
John & Lang 1990, Wruck 1990). There are two important findings in the 
literature regarding these costs.  Firstly the indirect costs are consistently 
estimated to be larger than the direct costs.  Secondly, that costs of both 
kinds are much greater in a rescue scenario than informal workouts.  Indirect 
costs, in particular are a direct function of time spent in the procedure and 
Chapter 11 is consistently shown to be a more drawn out procedure than 
13 
 
workouts.  In general expected time in the regime will be a fundamental 
influence on choice given this connection with indirect costs. 
 
Most attention in the literature has been given to ex post indirect costs, i.e. 
those emerging once financial distress has manifested and resolution with 
creditors is underway.  Increasing attention is being paid to ex ante indirect 
costs, which refers to the unfavourable impact on the availability or terms of 
finance even before formal insolvency.  This is based on creditors’ fears of 
costs should insolvency occur and as incentives to over- or under-invest prior 
to bankruptcy.  These ex ante costs, like the ex post, are apt to be influenced 
by the particular nature of the insolvency regime in place.  Problems of under- 
and over-investment also arise ex post and may also affect the availability and 
terms of credit ex ante.  For clarity these two types of indirect cost will be 
considered in turn, together with consideration of factors which might 
influence how large they will be.  Among the important ex post indirect costs 
are the following: 
 
3.1.1 Diversion of management time, which can result in weaker competitive 
performance and failure to exploit investment opportunities (Gilson, John and 
Lang 1990, Kaiser 1996, Belcher 1997, Wruck 1990).  There is no evidence 
this is a material consideration in either the UK or Sweden, therefore will not 
be discussed further. 
 
3.1.2 Under- or over-investment ex post.  Under-investment is the inability to 
raise sufficient finance (Gilson, John & Lang 1990, Gertner & Scharfstein 
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1991, Senbet and Seward 1995, Kaiser 1996). The availability of debtor-in-
possession financing is important here as most firms entering insolvency are 
cash deficientvi.  Under-investment is more likely in two, non-mutually 
exclusive circumstances.  Firstly the firm may have a substantial debt 
overhang, in which case shareholders cannot envisage a large enough return 
to yield themselves a positive expected return on any new funds invested.  
The same would apply to any new source of finance unless super-priority 
were available seeing them paid ahead of existing debt.  The second scenario 
is where debt maturity is short, which would include cases where creditors 
could enforce security immediately, possibility which can be forestalled by the 
availability of an effective moratorium.  The disincentive to invest here is that 
shareholders must bear all the risk of the investment since they must not only 
provide the incremental funds required for the investment but also “buy out” 
existing debtholders.  This can mean even a positive net present value project 
will have a negative expected return for shareholders (see Chen et al. 1995 
for details). 
Under-investment may also result from exposure to legal liability. Where firms 
or their advisers may be open to attack for trading on, then this may create a 
tendency towards early liquidation. 
Over-Investment ex post (as well as ex ante as discussed below), can result 
from shareholders and directors having an incentive to gamble with creditor’s 
money in projects with positive expected returns to shareholders but negative 
expected net present values (Chen et al. 1995, Keasey & Watson 1994).    A 
particularly egregious example in Chapter 11 is Eastern Airlines (Weiss & 
Wruck (1998). 
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3.1.3 Loss of customer and supplier goodwill, which can impose penalties of 
lost sales, reduced value of inventories and higher costs (Senbet and Seward 
1995, Kaiser 1996, Belcher 1997).  The ability to maintain supplier and 
customer goodwill will be influenced by whether or not the firm’s problems can 
be hidden and how the directors have behaved, particularly towards suppliers, 
in the run-up to bankruptcy.  Loss of employee goodwill will also limit choices 
(Senbet and Seward 1995) 
 
3.1.4 Bargaining costs (Senbet and Seward 1995, Kaiser 1996).  
Reorganisation plans have implications for the amount of value created for 
distribution and the way in which it is distributed.  Coalitions of creditor interest 
may form to maximise returns from the reorganisation process even if the 
overall outcome is inefficient.  Moreover, value can be destroyed in the 
process of resolving conflicts within and between creditor groups. Bankruptcy 
law can reduce these costs by narrowing the bargaining space (Brown 1989). 
 
Bargaining costs among creditors are likely to increase with the complexity of 
the firm’s capital structure (Senbet and Seward 1995).  The problem of 
creditor co-ordination is central to the choice of regime. Trade creditors are 
widely seen as presenting particular problems as they tend to be dispersed, 
heterogeneous and can eschew economic rationality (Gilson 1996). The more 
concentrated debt, the stronger the predisposition for a private workout.  The 
key reason here is that it is easier to gain required creditor support.  This is 
amplified if debt is in the hands of a bank (see Claessens & Klapper 2002 for 
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evidence) as banks are seen as sophisticated, rational creditors.  Secondly, 
banks are viewed as having superior monitoring abilities and therefore bank 
support signals the fact that the firm is viable as a going concern.  Conversely, 
where debt is held by many agents a formal regime is required to enforce co-
ordination and prevent perverse actions such as creditor runs (Gertner & 
Scharfstein 1991, Mooradian 1994). Majority rules which allow dissenting 
minorities to be bound into the reorganization plan considerably lessen the 
creditor co-ordination and holdout problems.  Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) in 
particular derive the result that it is better for firms likely to experience liquidity 
defaults (as opposed to strategic defaults) to contract with a single debtholder 
to avoid ex post inefficiencies of uncoordinated creditor action.  The result 
might be either a smoother liquidation yielding higher value than in an “asset 
grabbing” scenario or a greater likelihood of a successful reorganization for 
economically viable firms.  This contrasts with the superior debt bonding 
properties of dispersed debt holdings (Hart & Moore 1998). 
 
3.1.5 Other sources of indirect costs and value erosion ex post include: 
(a) Asset sales where “fire sale” prices prevail.  Intangible assets can 
be particularly harshly discounted (Gilson, John & Lang 1990). 
 
(b) Poor quality management remaining in control, especially where 
management weaknesses have been a source of failure (Hotchkiss 
1995). 
(c) Lack of legal flexibility (Wruck 1990) or delay (Baird 1986), where 
formal court leave is required. 
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(d) Subsidy and fiscal regimes where, for example, tax losses can be 
carried forward under reorganisation (White 1989) and interest 
obligations cease. 
 
3.2 Ex Ante Costs of Bankruptcy 
 
Hansen & Thomas (1998) identify four ex ante costs which may be associated 
with a particular bankruptcy regime. 
1. The punishment effect refers to the problem that managers may 
not have the right incentives to act efficiently if they expect 
lenient treatment in bankruptcy.  
2. The gambling effect recognises that some managers expect to 
be dealt with harshly in bankruptcy so have an incentive to take 
risks to achieve survival (see also Bowman 1980 1982 and 
Kahneman & Tversky 1979). 
3. The delay effect refers to the management fear of replacement 
within a bankruptcy procedure.  This will delay filing and erode 
value.  Highly leveraged firms may file earlier as distress 
becomes apparent more quickly, in part due to tighter monitoring 
by debt holders.  Restructuring in a workout may also be more 
likely, since early attention to problems preserves value 
(Chatterjee et al. 1996) 
4. Errors in reorganization or liquidating the wrong firms and 
violations of creditor priority (Senbet and Seward 1995, Webb 
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1991) destroy value for creditors and cognisance of this risk may 
distort the price and availability of credit ex ante. 
 
Indirect costs ex post or ex ante are at the heart of any debt resolution 
scheme and are subject to many variables.  The firm specific variables range 
from the quality of the management, the degree of leverage and the tangibility 
of assets as well as the number and mix of creditors.  External variables 
include the legal system, court processes and the availability of subsidies. 
 
3.3 The Case for Auctions. 
There are a number of basic arguments against reorganisation and in favour 
of liquidation via cash auctions, the key feature of bankruptcy in Sweden.  
These concentrate on the ex-post costs reviewed above and include costs of 
delay and negotiating time, small scale violations of priority (that can lead to 
ex ante and ex post distortions of credit availability (Weiss 1990).  In addition, 
auctions provide a market for corporate control which can discipline inefficient 
management (Eckbo and Thorburn 2003, Hansen & Thomas 1998).  At the 
same time, there is no evidence that auctions will lead to inefficient closure of 
viable businesses. Lastly, auctions provide a real valuation of the assets 
which creditors may generally prefer to a hypothetical valuation (Baird 1986). 
 
Stromberg (2000) argues that the problem of specific assets leading to under-
pricing in auctions may not be as serious as has been suggested because 
incumbent managers will have an incentive to bid for the assets themselves 
since there is a synergy with their own specific human capital.  Sale-backs to 
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incumbent management were also common in UK liquidations under 
receivership (Franks et al. 1996) and are becoming so under post 2003 
administration orders. 
 
Counterarguments to the desirability of auctions have been made by 
Easterbrook (1990).  Central to Easterbrook’s argument is the idea that if 
auctions had efficiency advantages, then firms would resort to them more 
readily and avoid formal insolvency or would lobby for formal procedures to be 
changed in favour of auctions.  To be efficient, auctions should be placed in 
the hands of those who will be residual claimants, yet this is hard to determine 
and may alter over time as value is eroded in a failing company. Finally, 
Easterbrook argues that auctions are likely to lead to underpricing of assets, 
eroding creditor value.  Hansen & Thomas (1998) point out a standard result 
in auction theory (Vickrey 1961) that the expected value in an auction will be 
less than either the true value of the asset or the winner’s maximum valuation 
of the asset.  The greater the uncertainty over the true value of the assets the 
worse this problem becomes.   
 
The remainder of this paper reviews the key UK and Swedish liquidation and 
reorganization regimes in the light of the above analysis. 
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4. The choice in the UK 
 
A variety of observable factors regarding the company may help distinguish 
which type of firm is likely to be placed in which type of insolvency regime. 
Standard financial ratio tests should provide some clue as to which firms are 
likely to be in a recoverable position, however accounting ratios have limited 
value in making genuinely ex ante judgements about which companies will 
survive and which will fail (Hamilton et al. 1997, Piesse and Wood 1992). The 
problem with such arbitrary accounting criteria is that they cannot distinguish 
between firms which are purely in financial distress and those which are also 
in economic distress.  What is relevant but harder to assess are the reasons 
for failure, the quality of its management and the robustness of its 
reconstruction plan.  In addition, information asymmetries make it harder to 
assess the prospects of small firms, not least since they tend to keep poorer 
accounting records (Nayak and Greenfield 1994).  This information 
asymmetry in respect of SMEs is mitigated by the ability of banks to monitor 
and their incentives to do so. 
 
Some other factors specific to the individual case will also bear on the 
decision whether or not to support reconstruction, including the complexity of 
the capital structure and the prospects of garnering sufficient creditor support.  
The longer the proposed reconstruction, the lower the chances of support. 
Both the Swedish Business Reconstruction Act and Administration 
procedures under the UK Enterprise Act 2002 effectively rule out cases where 
reconstruction will take longer than a year, although there is provision for 
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extensions in exceptional circumstances. Companies with high realisable 
asset values may be less likely to achieve support for a rescue regime 
because they are worth more dead than alive to secured creditors.  However, 
this does not preclude sale as a going-concern.  Assessing how these 
company-specific factors affect the chances of a firm being placed into a 
particular insolvency regime is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
 
A final consideration is the process whereby the decision is made.  In both 
countries banks have a strong de facto power to direct debtors under the 
threat of liquidation.  In the UK the Insolvency Practitioner also has an 
important influence in situations where they are approached by the directors 
of a distressed company. 
 
4.1 Direct costs 
 
In general these are not large given minimal court involvement, especially 
post Enterprise Act 2002.  prior to this legal costs were a disincentive to AO 
use for smaller firms. 
Banks do not appear to be particularly vigilant in keeping down the direct 
costs of bankruptcy.  Indeed comparing with Thorburn (2000), Franks & 
Sussman (2003) claim that Bank 1 in their sample had direct costs as a 
proportion of the total amount recovered 40% higher than in Swedish 
bankruptcy auctions and for Bank 2 in their study they were roughly twice as 
high.  Direct costs in general are regressive and in some small firm cases will 
exhaust available funds. 
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There is little doubt that banks continue to enjoy significant powers in 
insolvency even post Enterprise Act.  Although the figure varies widely among 
individual providers, banks supply around 40% of all SME debt (Franks and 
Sussman, 2003). Banks also typically have very strong creditor seniority by 
virtue of fixed charge security and floating charge benefits, including rights of 
appointment in the event of financial distress.  High recovery rates for the 
bank and low recovery rates for other creditors reveals that banks rarely make 
concessions to debtors.  This is evidence of “lazy” monitoring, against which 
there is clear evidence that banks do monitor and do attempt to address 
concerns through placing distressed firms in “intensive care” units. 
 
4.2 Indirect Costs 
 
4.2.1 Ability to raise finance 
 
The overriding expectation of an AO is that trading will be continued, at least 
in the short term.  The Administrator has wide powers under The Insolvency 
Act 1986 (Schedule 1 as amended) to carry on the business of the company, 
to raise or borrow money and grant security over the company’s property.  
Creditors dealing with the company post-appointment are informed that the 
Administrator has responsibility for debts but is indemnified by the company 
assets.  By contrast no such powers are enjoyed in its sister rescue procedure 
the CVA, which has been a long-standing criticism of the procedure. 
The issue of raising additional finance does not arise in liquidation, since the 
issue is simply to raise funds by asset sales and disburse them in priority 
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order.  Nevertheless, liquidation can remove the debt burden where a 
profitable core is sold in whole or in part. 
The problem of financing working capital is one which causes substantial 
practical difficulties in CVAs.  By definition, the firm starts off in a weak 
financial position and then will be required not only to make payments into the 
creditors’ fund out of cash flow but must also avoid any new debts not 
covered by the stay on creditor actions.  The longer the proposed duration of 
the CVA, the worse this problem becomes.  By comparison with this long 
uphill struggle, cutting the firm’s losses and buying the business back via 
liquidation or “pre-pack” under an AO may seem very preferable. 
 
4.2.2 Ex post under- or over-investment. 
 
The strongly creditor-oriented system in the UK means that there is no 
systematic distortion towards over-investment in the bankruptcy regime.  
Some investment in distressed companies will result in dissipation, yet this 
simply reflects the irreducible risk attending any commercial investment. 
 
Kahl (2002) modelled the bank’s decision to support a restructuring which 
captures some important features of the CVA, in particular that it may provide 
a valuable “real option”.  Creditors face a problem when a firm enters financial 
distress in determining whether the firm is viable or should be liquidatedvii.  
Kahl argues that if creditors were confident in the future prospects of the firm 
then the most efficient course of action would be to convert debt to equity and 
allow the firm to trade on free from debt overhang.  Retaining debt claims, 
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while it hinders the firm, can nevertheless be a rational strategy for creditors.  
Retaining debt claims gives creditors the outside option of liquidating the firm 
if it does not recover.  The model also shows that it may be rational for 
creditors to continue to support the distressed firm even if the firm defaults on 
its debt repayments during the restructuring.  The CVA proposal can commit 
the distressed firm to a schedule of dividend payments into a creditors’ fund 
and if these payments are not kept up the supervisor is empowered to petition 
for the winding up of the firm.  Alternatively the supervisor can propose an 
amendment to the original plan incorporating an extension of the repayment 
term and a reduction in the amount of debt recovery.  Provided the required 
majority vote is obtained the CVA will continue. 
 
CVAs also mitigate the under-investment problem through debt forgiveness 
which can help address the disincentive from the equityholders’ point of view 
of a substantial debt overhang. 
 
Until The Insolvency Act 2000 UK companies wishing to use the VA 
procedure could not protect themselves from unilateral action by creditors 
without, first, appointing an administrator.  For small companies, in particular, 
this was too costly, leaving liquidation as the only realistic option.  
Amendments to the VA procedure, which came into effect in 2002, allow 
"small companies" to be protected by a moratorium on all legal action against 
them. Take up of this option has been extremely poor.  Reasons advanced by 
the UK IPs interviewed being the complexity of the legislation and the 
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perceived exposure to legal liability involved in being required to vouch for the 
viability of the reconstruction. 
The practical importance of the absence of a moratorium in a CVA is open to 
question in the light of Franks and Sussman’s (2003) evidence that creditor 
runs are rare.  Nevertheless, the risk is important, as it has acted as a 
deterrent to IPs putting in the groundwork necessary to prepare a case for a 
CVA. 
 
4.2.3 Vulnerability to legal liability.   
 
This may dispose both banks and insolvency practitioners to favour a quick 
winding up of the company to avoid potential liability from trading on.  Franks 
and Torous (1992) report a strong impression from IPs that there is less risk 
from a rapid sale of the business than from raising new funds to keep the 
company afloat.  Whilst the IP is indemnified from the assets of the business 
such assets may not be valuable enough to support the risk.  Potential liability 
as a shadow director may inhibit trading on in a VA or informal workout, being 
a concern for the bank, the IP and possibly also a creditors’ committee. 
 
4.2.4 Loss of customer, supplier and employee goodwill 
 
Informal workouts and CVAs have the potential advantage that they can keep 
a company’s financial distress hidden to some extent from suppliers and 
customers.  Industry clustering will aid the visibility of distress.  Moreover, 
workouts and CVAs depend for feasibility on good relationships with trade 
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creditors.  Customer and supplier goodwill are also important in liquidation as 
sale values will be affected, by being harder to maintain, as both customers 
and suppliers reflect negatively on the news that the IP has been appointed. 
The situation regarding employees will depend to some extent on how the 
process of bankruptcy is managed and how they see their prospects of job 
retention.  Generally a workout or a CVA sends a more positive signal. 
Taking the option of liquidation runs the risk of damaging the prospects of the 
business as a going concern.  Trade creditors may be resentful as they 
typically come away from a liquidation empty handed.  In practice this problem 
does not appear to be particularly acute as most trade creditors are practical 
and will look to the prospect of good business in the future. 
 
4.2.5 Bargaining costs and creditor co-ordination 
Overall, as directors gain flexibility and control through greater informality, the 
price exacted by creditors increases.  Higher support is needed as formality 
reduces, being effectively 100% from all classes of creditor in an informal 
workout, where an unsecured creditor owed as little as £750 can unilaterally 
petition for the winding up of the company.  Administration and VA require 
75% support from unsecured creditors together with 100% support from key 
secured creditors.  This is quite a high threshold of support, yet is not viewed 
as being at an unrealistic level providing the company has a sound 
reconstruction plan and does have the desirable feature of being able to bind 
dissenting unsecured creditors into the plan.   
Bargaining and co-ordination costs are low under liquidation, where creditors 
and directors have no say provided procedural rules are not infringed.  The 
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informal rehabilitation undertaken by banks as described in Franks and 
Sussman (2003) also avoids bargaining costs as banks act unilaterally, often 
to the detriment of other creditors. 
Unsecured and trade creditors find that their influence increases as the 
informality of the re-organisation increases.  Even small creditors can force a 
“holdout” situation if unanimous approval of rescue plans is needed.  More 
generally, unsecured creditors play little active role in reconstruction. 
 
4.2.6 The right of the debtor to remain in possession.   
 
Here the issue hinges on whether or not incumbent management is an asset 
or a liability to the firm.  Incompetent managers do remain in possession in UK 
CVAs (Cook et al. 2003), yet on the other hand managers are removed from 
control in and most other formal UK insolvency procedures, even though they 
may have valuable skills and experience to contribute.  It is a weakness of the 
CVA that managers cannot be removed and are not subject to direction from 
the IP and this weakness contributes to inefficient continuation of the 
company and potentially also inefficient investment ex post.  This can be 
remedied by either combining a CVA with an AO or drafting sufficient control 
clauses into the CVA to allow a supervisor effective veto powers. 
From the secured creditor’s point of view, a successful rescue could improve 
realisable values of secured assets as well as preserving a profitable 
business relationship. The secured creditor, however, has little incentive to 
take a gamble in cases of doubt, which stands in contrast to unsecured 
creditors who, like the directors of the company and equity holders face 
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essentially a one-way bet with something to gain if the plan succeeds and 
nothing to lose if it does not.  In this respect there is a bias in favour of 
premature liquidation. 
 
4.2.7 Freedom of action.   
 
The chances of effective rescue will be made more difficult where whoever is 
in effective control of the business lacks freedom of manoeuvre.  This was 
part of the thinking behind the design of the AO in the UK, where swift and 
decisive action can be taken by the IP.  The CVA contains flexibility at the 
outset as there is considerable freedom for directors and creditors to fashion a 
bespoke reconstruction plan.  Managers also have unimpaired freedom of 
action within a CVA as long as they maintain their agreed schedule of 
payments into the creditors’ fund.  However, the powers available under the 
CVA, particularly the lack of ability to void contracts gives less room for 
manoeuvre than the AO.  In this regard the CVA is even less favourable than 
straight liquidation where the obligations of the company cease.  The same 
pertains in informal workouts which face the additional problem of maintaining 
100% creditor support. 
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4.2.8 Ex ante costs 
 
Without significant evidence of “fraudulent” behaviour directors are not treated 
either particularly harshly or leniently in the UK system.  The balance for the 
gambling effect is on the side of directors, equityholders and unsecured 
creditors wishing to prolong the life of the firm. 
In general there is a perceived problem in the UK of firms delaying coming 
forward, thereby lessening the prospects of reconstruction and perhaps 
dissipating value in liquidation.  The fact the debtor is allowed to remain in 
possession within a CVA appears to have had no influence on early filling.  
One of the potential triggers for a company filing for a CVA is a petition for 
winding up presented by an unsecured creditor.  However the structure of 
insolvency law provides poor incentives for unsecured creditors who achieve 
low recoveries.  Some creditors may rationalise petitioning for liquidation as a 
punishment for directors.  A remedy for this would be to grant a petitioning 
creditor the incentive of more elevated status in the priority chain but this 
would be unattractive as it would create a perverse incentive in favour of 
asset runs and would distort the market for credit. 
The delay effect is, however, much mitigated in the UK for SMEs due to the 
fact that their debt tends to be heavily concentrated in the form of bank debt. 
Franks and Sussman’s (2003) evidence is that this concentration of debt does 
result in appropriate levels of monitoring by banks (Diamond 1984) and 
remedial action appears to be taken promptly.  It is less certain that this 
mechanism works as effectively for large firms. 
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Cook et al. (2003) find that only about 1 in 5 CVAs is successful to the extent 
that the firm fulfils its plan and continues to trade free of insolvency.  They 
also report the general consensus that firms tend to carry on too long before 
addressing their problems.  The implication is that some of these firms could 
be rescued if only they came forward sooner.  Finally, it appears less true 
than it was that secured creditors will enforce premature liquidation, although 
there is a bias towards premature liquidation within AR given the receivers 
potential liability when trading on.  Taken together the impression is that value 
is being destroyed in the main from liquidation or rescue not coming soon 
enough. 
CVAs and informal workouts can lead to a loss of security rights (for example 
in a debt for equity swap) or security value as the asset is further run-down 
whilst attempting to trade profitably.  Trade creditors could gain at the 
expense of secured creditors if they raise supply prices to recoup some of 
their debt, although there is no clear evidence of a systematic bias. 
 
4.3 Other factors influencing the choice of regime 
 
4.3.1 Institutional factors and learning 
 
The rehabilitation efforts of banks outside formal insolvency have been the 
result of learning.  One bank admitted it had been crude in its approach to 
insolvency before the 1990s and in particular had not properly understood 
how to get the most out of the CVA procedure.  This is in terms not only of 
deciding which firms to place in a CVA and which not, but also ensuring that 
the plan was properly constructed and administered.  There has also been an 
investment in learning required on the part of IPs too and the majority have 
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judged this not to be worth the while.  Attitudes of Crown creditors have also 
become more favourable to rescue over time. 
This evidence regarding the response of banks to financial distress on SMEs 
stands in distinction to the evidence regarding how banks react to such 
distress in large firms, where the response is both more varied and in some 
cases more lenient (Asquith et al. 1994).  Franks & Sussman ascribe the lack 
of bank concessions towards SMEs to bureaucratisation in so far as those 
bank officers who deal with these cases lack the seniority to make such 
concessions.  This contrasts with the case of large firms whose cases are 
dealt with by more senior bank officials and where there is evidence of debt 
forgiveness. 
 
4.3.2 Incentives of the IP 
 
Fee income relative to work done is an important consideration for the IP.  
This may be the case in the short-term but in the longer-term success relies 
on maintaining a good working relationship with major lenders and building up 
a respectable track record of successful cases (Flood and Skordaki, 1995).  
Thus IPs have an incentive to side with the bank’s interests. 
One view of "rescue" procedures is that they provide the opportunity for 
multiple fees as practitioner costs are often calculated on a time basis and the 
failure of a rescue package may well result in the same practitioner being 
appointed as liquidator to "mop up".  Again, this ignores the reputational risk 
associated with failure and the growing set of guidelines and codes of conduct 
within the insolvency profession.  Licensing of practitioners, introduced in the 
1986 Insolvency Act, offers the opportunity to punish practitioners who abuse 
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their position.  Unfortunately, the dubious activities of some have reflected 
badly, albeit unfairly, on the procedure itself. 
Cook et al. (2003) reveal that only a minority of IPs have experience of 
conducting VAs and this lack of familiarity is a barrier to their use.  IPs feel 
more comfortable with procedures such as liquidation which they are fully 
conversant with.  IPs are deterred from using VAs by other aspects of 
uncertainty such as the difficulty of committing to a proposal and the business 
plan which underpins it which may stretch several years into the future and 
which may be undermined by events.   IPs also feel uneasy about their lack of 
control in VAs, where they have no powers to investigate or run the company 
and are essentially just there to collect monies owed and make 
disbursements.  IPs have a strong professional norm that they should bring 
order and certainty to what is typically a confused and fraught situation.  This 
brings a bias against the VA where too much is left to chance.  A final 
important element of uncertainty, related to the others, is the difficulty of 
assessing the quality of the continuing directors in the short space of time 
between appointment and VA approval (typically two months). 
 
 
4.3.3 Future relationships 
 
With substantial debt recovery benefits it is questionable whether banks also 
value the private benefits of a continued business relationship that a rescue 
can offer.  A successful rescue could provide a continued relationship for 
unsecured creditors too whilst a break-up will only provide the return of a 
portion of the debt.  It should be acknowledged that in the UK debt recovery 
will include a Value Added Tax refund.  Some trade debts are also insured but 
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this can restrict credit terms granted (CMRC, 2005).  There is more certainty 
but less reward in liquidation. An important influence on whether or not 
unsecured creditors will support a VA, for example, is whether or not they 
believe the directors have acted reasonably.  The erosion of unsecured 
creditor confidence in the directors is a problem which tends to worsen the 
longer directors delay coming forward to address their problems. 
 
Banks do appear to have become more mindful of the impact of their 
treatment of distressed firms on their reputation more generally.  One 
influence on the declining use of administrative receivership has been fears 
that if banks were seen as riding roughshod, particularly over SMEs, then 
more radical legislation might be forthcoming diluting their rights.  There may 
also be some concern to avoid an unfavourable image among potential SME 
customers, although the general lack of competition in this market speaks 
against this being a major influence. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
The strong position of banks gives a partial explanation of why formal rescue 
mechanisms such as CVAs and Administration are not more widely used.  
Essentially banks have little need for them, being able to take effective action 
themselves to either put the distressed firm back on a stable financial footing 
or ultimately to have the company liquidated with the bank more often than 
not making a full recovery of debt.  Only in a very small set of cases is the 
chosen insolvency procedure by a Debt Recovery Unit a CVA. 
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5. The choice in Sweden 
 
5.1 Direct Costs 
Thorburn (2000) finds that direct costs of auctions are low, averaging 6.4% of 
pre-filing book value of assets for standard auctions and 2.5% for pre-pack 
auctions.  Since there is an element of fixed cost, the percentage tends to fall 
the larger the firm.  This is comparable with costs in Chapter 11.  Thorburn 
concludes that cash auctions score well in terms of indirect costs since they 
have the advantage of speed.  Recovery rates for creditors averaged 35% 
overall, 29% for piecemeal liquidations and 39% for going concern auctions, 
the latter comparable with Franks and Torous’ (1994) evidence of 41% 
recoveries in their sample of Chapter 11 reorganizations. 
As in the UK, banks enjoy a very strong position.  Banks and directors of the 
company have an incentive to act in concert, typically to the detriment of the 
unsecured creditors. 
 
5.2 Indirect Costs 
 
5.2.1 Ability to raise finance 
This issue is circumvented in the cash auction regime.  Directors wishing to 
buy the business in a saleback will need usually to raise new finance.  
However, this may be seen as a market test of the case for the incumbent 
management retaining control of the assets.  Within reconstruction, there is 
provision for debtor-in-possession financing with super-priority.  In practice, 
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the preference seems to be for the firm cutting its losses and making a fresh 
start. 
 
5.2.2 Ex post under- or over-investment 
 
The Swedish system is biased in favour of a quick sale (Stromberg 2000).  On 
the one hand this economises on indirect costs which are related to time in 
bankruptcy.  It may also represent a way of eradicating a debt overhang.  On 
the other hand, unless new debt finance can be secured it may create a bias 
towards under-investment in that more of the call for new funds might have to 
come from equity.  
 
The stay on creditor actions is effective both in bankruptcy auctions and 
reconstruction, therefore this aspect does not appear to be an influence on 
choice of regime.  The lack of protection against secured creditors has been 
seen as powerful inhibitor against use of the Ackord (Thorburn 2000). 
 
5.2.3 Vulnerability to legal liability.   
 
From the Swedish director's perspective the disadvantages of bankruptcy are 
small in comparison to those in reconstruction whilst the advantages of 
bankruptcy clearly outweigh those available in any rescue scenario.  Swedish 
directors appear to consider, far more, their immediate liability and their 
longer-term relationship with the Swedish banks than the retention of control 
of a troubled company.  
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5.2.4 Bargaining costs and creditor co-ordination 
 
Bargaining costs are minimal in bankruptcy which is a very quick and clean 
procedure (Thorburn 2000).  Whilst there may in practice be some behind the 
scenes lobbying and perhaps negotiations for purchase, the procedure avoids 
the extensive courtroom costs associated with disputes over the value of 
assets and claims in Chapter 11.  Less evidence is to hand on bargaining 
costs in reconstruction, although it is likely they will be slightly higher than in a 
cash auction. 
 
5.2.5 The right of the debtor to remain in possession.   
 
One feature of the Swedish auction system is that management is removed 
upon bankruptcy.  This, it has been argued, may lead managers to gamble on 
risky projects in financial distress as they have nothing to lose and much to 
gain if the gamble succeeds.  Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) argue that the 
opposite may be true, that CEOs of distressed firms may be more likely to 
invest conservatively in the hope of preserving a viable business which can be 
sold as a going concern in the auction and increasing their own chances of 
being re-hired by the auction winner as reward for their stewardship.  In 
addition, managers, they suggest, will be concerned for their personal 
reputations and thus would be averse to taking actions likely to be regarded 
as reckless.  They produce evidence consistent with these claims for a 
sample of Swedish firms. The authors find that there appears to be only a 
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short delay in filing, on average 4 months, which speaks against the incentive 
of managers to put off the evil day of reckoning as long as possible. 
 
5.2.6 Flexibility.   
 
The rules governing bankruptcy auctions are not in themselves flexible, 
however in terms of the management of the business the procedure 
generates high levels of flexibility.  Whoever wins the bid is essentially able to 
do with the business as they will.  There appears to be less freedom of 
manoeuvre in setting up reconstructions. 
 
 
5.2.7 Distortion of choice through availability of subsidies 
Often cited as a major factor in favour of bankruptcy is the State Wage 
Guarantee. This provides a potentially large subsidy to a firm in bankruptcy 
not available to a firm in reconstruction.  The existence of the Guarantee 
provides a large incentive to directors to opt for bankruptcy.  The firm is able 
to trade on with the benefit of a subsidy and the proceeds are available to pay 
claims.  The ability to trade on is an advantage for directors who rely to some 
extent on the continuation of the firm to maintain asset values and goodwill as 
they negotiate their own exit route from the bankruptcy with secured creditors. 
 
Directors can also be personally liable for unpaid wages and taxes, delivering 
a powerful incentive to opt for bankruptcy rather than reconstruction The 
Wage Guarantee Act 1992 offers government funding to pay wages up to 
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SEK100,000 (£6,500) per employee in bankruptcy situations.  The guarantee 
can be extended to allow continued trading during bankruptcy, also 
undermining some of the benefits of rescue. 
The subsidy represented by the Wage Guarantee Act provides a strong 
incentive for all classes of creditor to support a bankruptcy, since these are 
guaranteed funds compared to the uncertain prospect of improved prospects 
in a reconstruction. 
 
One potential disadvantage of cash auctions is the emphasis on a speedy 
sale as this might depress valuations.  By contrast, reconstructions may avoid 
these costs. 
 
5.3 Ex ante costs 
The main aspect of the punishment effect for directors is where they fail to file 
for liquidation in line with the requirements of the balance sheet test.  
Evidence is that the law regarding mandatory filing for liquidation is almost 
always adhered to.   
The delay effect situation in Sweden has some things in common with the UK.  
Debt among SMEs is concentrated in the bank which has a strong incentive to 
monitor.  By contrast whilst unsecured creditors can petition for the 
bankruptcy of a company, with no minimum on the amount owed, few will 
benefit from such action.  Unsecured creditors have no protection under 
insolvency legislation and little power to influence proceedings.  Most 
unsecured creditors, traditionally the lowest priority level of creditors, receive 
little or no dividend in bankruptcy but have the potential to benefit more from 
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reconstruction.  An additional benefit of reconstruction and a strong factor 
against commencing bankruptcy action is the possibility of continued trading 
relationships with the debtor company, although this is mitigated by the high 
proportion of going concern sales in bankruptcy auctions. 
Given the high propensity of incumbent management purchases in sale-
backs, directors of troubled companies have less incentive to gamble as they 
have the prospect of resolving the financial distress and retaining control of 
their business in the bankruptcy auction. 
The Swedish regime appears to do well on inefficient reorganisations and 
liquidations.  Thorburn’s evidence suggests that the auction system does not 
give rise to a significant problem of premature liquidation given the high 
proportion of businesses which are preserved as going concerns.  The very 
small numbers in reconstruction indicate there are few problems of inefficient 
reorganisation. 
One important feature of sale-backs which Stromberg notes is that the bank 
and the equity holders do well in sale-backs, particularly in illiquid markets, 
thus violating some creditor priroity.  The reason is that the assets can be 
bought back relatively cheaply relative to the true going concern value, which 
creates a surplus to be shared between the bank and shareholders.  Thus 
although the proceeds of the auction are distributed in strict priority order, this 
benefit to the shareholders may produce de facto violations of absolute 
priority.  This conclusion needs to be qualified in so far as many of the 
unsecured creditors will also have an interest in the business going forward 
(Stromberg 2000).  It is not clear what ex ante effects if any these violations of 
priority give rise to regarding the availability and terms of trade credit. 
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5.4 Other factors influencing the choice of regime 
 
5.4.1 Institutional factors and learning 
 
Swedish commercial culture appears to embrace the ability of directors to 
resurrect failed firms.  In many cases directors are able to arrange new 
funding, shrug off old liabilities and maintain strong relationships with secured 
lenders (mainly banks).  Although bankruptcy does not offer the super-priority 
for new debt it does match the virtual stay on creditor action found in 
reconstruction. 
Reconstructions have been stifled and this, in itself, perpetuates their low 
incidence.  A secured creditor would need to see massive benefits of a 
reconstruction and be able to trust an Insolvency Practitioner to deliver these 
before committing to such a plan.  Lack of experience amongst the insolvency 
professionals only adds to the reasons to opt for bankruptcy in most cases. 
The Swedish banking industry is typified by a few large institutions sharing the 
bulk of corporate business lending.  Following the retrenchment and 
reassessment of risk of the early 1990's these institutions err on the side of 
caution and are not motivated by competitive pressures to take on additional 
risk. 
 
 
5.4.2 Incentives of the IP 
 
It is difficult to characterise the insolvency profession in Sweden.  Most 
practitioners have a legal background and operate as part of major law firms.  
One exception, however, is the trade body Ackordscentralen.  Practitioners 
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here are legally trained but display a more commercial outlook. Experience 
suggests, however, that Ackordscentralen's managers deal with far more 
bankruptcy than reconstruction due to the lack of incentive for directors to call 
for help. 
 
5.4.3 Future relationships 
 
As is the case in the UK, it is trade creditors who perhaps have the most to 
gain from ongoing trading relationship.  In this respect it is not clear that 
bankruptcy serves their interests badly as it has a good track record in 
preserving businesses. 
To assume that insolvency practitioners merely wish to maximise fees earned 
is simplistic.  They also wish to retain good working relationships with major 
lenders (banks) on whom they rely for introductions.  This is a powerful 
argument for bankruptcy being sought in most cases. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The choice in Sweden is stark with little flexibility in both theory and practice.  
The low uptake of compositions cannot be explained by the logic that 
characterises the UK scene.  In the UK directors can "buy" flexibility and 
control by obtaining high creditor acceptance for their plans and offering 
improved returns and continued trading relationships.  In Sweden the strong 
position of secured creditors skews this choice despite the reconstruction 
legislation being creditor - friendly, especially where it gives super-priority for 
new lending (not available in the UK). 
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The power of the secured creditor has been the focus of concern in Sweden 
but little has been done to amend legislation.  To date proposals have been 
made by the Right of Priority Committee (1999) to amend The Right of Priority 
Act 1970 in order to create incentives for lenders to focus decisions on 
borrowers' ability to repay, rather than on security.  The same proposals hope 
to encourage earlier filing for reorganisation.  The proposals, still to be 
enacted, include the reduction of the Business Mortgage (akin to the floating 
charge in the UK) to 50% of all property; the abolition of priority for withholding 
taxes (VAT etc).  Restriction on the amount that the government can claim in 
the stead of those employees it has paid through its wage guarantee is also 
mooted.  These proposals, with the exception of the wage guarantee 
changes, show a similar approach to encouraging rescue by amending 
insolvency rules and rights of priority as in the UK.  This research questions, 
however, the assumption that the legal framework is the key barrier to 
rescues in both countries. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The cost-benefit framework has allowed an objective overview of the 
insolvency choices in both UK and Sweden and permits general conclusions 
to be made.  Table 4 contains a synoptic comparison of regimes (+ indicates 
the regime economises on a particular cost, - that it tends to exaggerate such 
costs and ? implies some ambiguity).  The preference for bankruptcy in 
43 
 
Sweden is related to its decisive advantages in terms of indirect costs over 
reconstruction.  It is quick, which itself economises on indirect costs, benefits 
from a substantial subsidy in terms of the State Wage Guarantee, avoids 
costly bargaining and provides and efficient and effective solution to the 
problems of valuing assets and determining in whose hands the assets find 
their highest valued use.  Nevertheless, it is not simply the formal structure of 
the procedure which makes it work.  Nothing in that formal structure 
guarantees that directors would be as willing to file as early as they do, nor 
that banks would be so willing to co-operate with them to the extent that more 
than half of them end up repurchasing their businesses.  It is a more open 
question what ex ante costs the procedure gives rise to in terms of the cost 
and availability of credit. 
 
Liquidation enjoys many of the same advantages in the UK, yet is less 
amenable to the preservation of the business as a going concern.  In this 
regard the AO scores better given the wider powers of the administrator to 
trade on.  What limited the traditional administrative receivership as a rescue 
vehicle was the poor incentives for the receiver to trade on given sole 
obligation to the appointing secured creditor and the potential liability for new 
debts.  In terms of direct costs, the CVA compares favourably with other 
regimes, yet its key weaknesses in terms of indirect costs are manifest.  Its 
average length of two years compared to weeks in a liquidation alone would 
drive a marked difference in indirect costs.   Yet the position is worse.  Under-
investment ex post is endemic given the lack of debtor-in-possession 
financing and the squeeze on working capital occasioned by a protracted 
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period of commitment to paying into a creditors’ fund while at the same time 
avoiding further arrears.  The procedure also has critical limitations in terms of 
a lack of powers to either change or direct management.  In this respect it is 
inferior to every other type of regime.  What was thought at the inception of 
the Insolvency Act 1986 to be one of the great virtues of this debtor-in-
possession regime, that it would encourage early filing, has proved to be a 
mirage.  The ex ante costs of delay and gambling effects remain substantial 
and unmitigated.  In this respect, the legislation has singularly failed to 
appreciate the psychology of directors of distressed companies (see Milman 
and Cook 2002).  
 
It is in the lack of control and the length of the procedure that it is most evident 
that the framework of legislation has been found wanting in terms of failing to 
understand the incentives and motives of insolvency practitioners.  To them 
being supervisor of a CVA places them in an invidious position of having 
responsibility without authority.  This coupled with the inherent uncertainties of 
a drawn out procedure – and one with which only a small minority if IPs to this 
day have any experience of – is a substantial deterrent to its use by 
professionals who are strongly motivated by their norms to bring order and 
certainty to any insolvency scenario.  The framework of legislation and policy 
debate, at least in the UK, does not acknowledge the apparently substantial 
role of banks in informal restructuring of SMEs.   More could be done to 
promote and facilitate this work, particularly given the superior monitoring 
ability and incentives of banks. 
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In many of these respects the new style AO regime ushered in by the 
Enterprise Act 2002 holds promise.  The direct costs of the regime have been 
lowered by a much reduced role for the court.  It still retains the wide powers 
for the administrator to trade on and to tackle the problem of weak 
management and is also more favourable to “pre-pack” sales of assets to re-
financed incumbent management. 
 
What, then, are the key strengths and weaknesses of the UK and Swedish 
bankruptcy regimes? In both the UK and Sweden the powerful position of 
banks means that the insolvency regime is efficient in preserving businesses, 
if not companies. There is a great deal of flexibility inherent in the UK system, 
created in part by the wider menu of bankruptcy regimes on offer.  This 
flexibility offers the chance to tailor the chosen regime more closely to the 
specific circumstances of the insolvent company.  Herein also lies a potential 
weakness in that powerful creditors may bring about a collectively sub-optimal 
resolution by forcing the company into a regime which bests serves their 
interests or by extracting concession under the threat to do so.  The ability of 
banks always to enforce administrative receivership is an example, but one 
now largely foreclosed by the Enterprise Act 2002.  The key advantages of 
the Swedish cash auction system are that it is quick, efficient and subjects the 
valuation and control of assets to a market test.  Its main disadvantages are 
that it appears to be prejudicial to the interests of unsecured creditors.  It is 
also very strongly biased against corporate reconstruction. 
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What does this evidence imply about the utility of the government’s attempts 
to use insolvency law reform to combat the fear of failure and so promote 
entrepreneurship?   Firstly, the low numbers of CVAs in the UK and 
reconstructions in Sweden imply that its influence may be slight.  
Nevertheless in the case of CVAs, the procedure does allow the problems of 
insolvent small firms to be addressed, resulting with good rates of business 
survival and orderly wind-up in those cases where the company cannot be 
saved.  Thus CVAs can help avoid failure or, if not, mitigate its effects. To that 
extent, the CVA probably deserves to be more strongly promoted.  One 
aspect which is particularly important is that CVAs pay better returns to trade 
creditors than other types of regime, thus helping to avoid a domino effect 
where the failure of one company can lead to the failure of its suppliers.  
Nevertheless, policy makers have to be realistic.  The CVA is not, nor could it 
be, a panacea. 
 
Whilst the focus of legislators in both countries is on the detail of the various 
measures in place to encourage debtor reconstruction and rescue the legal 
framework itself only provides opportunities - it is the key motivations and 
economic costs and benefits of stakeholders that dictate whether a rescue is 
initiated.  Legislators need to bear in mind that social institutions and cultural 
attitudes tend to change slowly, despite changes in the law (North 1990).  
One issue policymakers still need to address satisfactorily is how to get 
directors of failing companies to come forward sooner.  Doing so will increase 
the chances of a successful turnaround and limit the extent to which directors 
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dissipate their personal wealth in what may prove to be a doomed attempt to 
keep a company afloat.  This, however, is likely to prove a tough nut to crack. 
 
The paper suggests a number of directions for further research.  A 
fundamental problem in choice of regime is how to tell apart firms with 
genuine prospects from those which are not viable.  More needs to be known 
about turnaround of SMEs.  Little appears to be known about the ex ante 
effects of different bankruptcy regimes on the terms and availability of trade 
credit.  Mindful of the prime motivation of the global trend of bankruptcy 
reform, to encourage entrepreneurship, we need to better understand whether 
unsecured creditors and entrepreneurship more generally might be better 
served by attempting rehabilitation as opposed to “phoenixism”.  More 
research is warranted into the extent of underpricing in cash auctions.  The 
debate about promoting corporate rescue is predicted on the assumption that 
there is a widespread problem of viable businesses being broken up.  A sober 
assessment is needed as to how extensive this problem really is to provide 
legislators with a realistic assessment of what could be achieved and whether, 
indeed, any further action is really necessary.  Finally, a better understanding 
is required of the decision processes which lead both to filing for bankruptcy 
and how the choice is actually made to place a firm in one regime or another.  
This will help in framing legislation in such a way which will genuinely 
influence such choices.
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Alternative insolvency regimes in the UK and Sweden 
 
 UK Sweden 
Rescue • Corporate Voluntary 
Arrangement 
• Administration 
• Administrative 
Receivership 
• Scheme of Arrangement
 
• Reconstruction 
• Ackord 
Liquidation • Compulsory Liquidation 
• Voluntary Liquidation 
• Bankruptcy 
• Liquidation 
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Table 2 Corporate Insolvencies in England & Wales 1995-2004 
 
Type of Insolvencya 1995 1997 1999 2000 
 
2001 2003 2004 
Compulsory Liquidations 5519 4735 5209 4925 
 
4675 5234 4584 
Creditors’ Voluntary 
liquidations 
9017 7875 9071 9392 
 
1029
7 
8950 7608 
Administrative 
Receiverships 
3266 1837 1618 1595 
 
1914 1261 864 
Administration Orders 
(inc. AO under Enterprise. 
Act 2002)b 
163 196 440 438 
 
698 
 
726 
(247) 
458 
(457) 
Voluntary Arrangements 372 629 475 557 
 
597 726 597 
Source: DTI Statistics Directorate, 2005 
a some companies may be subject to more than one procedure 
b Enterprise Act appointments only after 15 September 2003. 
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Table 3 Corporate Insolvencies in Sweden 1995 - 2004 
 
Type of Insolvency 1995 1997 1999 2000 
 
2001 2003 2004 
Bankruptcy 12655 11044 7362 6733 
 
7433 8237 7649 
Compositionsa (Ackord) 119 40   
 
   
Corporate Reconstructionsb  191 109 50 
 
31 35 47 
Source: Institutet för Tillväxtpolitiska Studier, 2005. 
a Under Composition Act 1970 
b Under Business Reconstruction Act 1996 (Effective 1 September 1996) 
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Table 4.  Synoptic Comparison of Costs in Each Regime 
 Cost 
 
Regime 
Direct 
costs 
Ability to 
raise 
finance 
Under- or 
over-
investment 
Stay on 
actions 
Legal 
liability if 
trading on 
Loss of 
goodwill 
Bargaining 
costs 
Ability to 
remove poor 
management 
Freedom 
of action 
Subsidy 
distortions 
Ex ante 
costs 
UK            
Liquidation ++ ? -- 
under-
investment 
? 
too late 
- -? 
poor 
signal but 
soon 
complete 
++ ++ ? ++ - 
delay and 
gambling 
effects 
Administrative 
Receivership 
++ ? - 
under-
investment 
? 
too late 
-- -? 
poor 
signal but 
soon 
complete 
++ ++ + ++ - 
delay and 
gambling 
effects 
Informal Bank 
Workout for 
SMEs 
++ ? + 
bank takes 
informed 
decision 
- 
little point 
in a 
petition 
? 
potential 
liability  
+ + + ++ ++ ? 
effect on 
trade 
credit 
CVA + -- + + + ++ ? -- + ++ ? 
Administration ? + + ++ ? + ? + ++ ++ ? 
Sweden            
Liquidation ++ ? + ? 
too late 
+ + ++ ++ + +++ ? 
Reconstruction ? ? ? + + + ? ? + --- ? 
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Footnotes: 
                                                          
i A maximum of 12 months. 
ii ”Small companies” should meet two of the three criteria of: Turnover below ₤2.8 m., Balance Sheet 
totals below ₤1.4 m. and fewer than 50 employees. 
iii Floating charges are non-possessory security interests in the uncharged assets of the debtor 
company. 
iv The “prescribed part” of floating charge realisations available to unsecured creditors has a ₤10,000 
minimum value, a ₤600,000 maximum value and is calculated on the scale of 50% of the first ₤10,000 
and 20% of any remainder. 
v Prior to 15 September 2003 Crown creditors (mainly uncollected employment tax (PAYE) and 
purchase tax (VAT) had preferential status and ranked above floating charge holders. 
vi UK insolvency law enshrines two definitions of insolvency, the Balance Sheet test and the Liquidity 
test. 
vii He notes that this is a dynamic problem given high recidivism rates of firms which have been in 
chapter 11. 
